INTRODUCTION
'… an increasing amount of policy development, and particularly policy change, in contemporary polities is affected by policy transfer. As such, when we are analysing policy change we always need to ask the question: Is policy transfer involved?' (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 20) The process of policy transfer between states has attracted growing interest amongst analysts in recent years. Whilst 'policy transfer has existed as long as organised government' (Dolowitz, 2000: 1) , the contemporary interest is prompted by a perceived growth in transfers in an increasingly interconnected world. 4 But when does policy transfer end and domestic policy development begin? Or are the two inseparable? Domestic policy developments often motivate and certainly frame the transfer of policies. At the other end of the cycle, domestic developments may transform radically that which has been transferred. This paper argues we may only know the ultimate effect of policy transfer by considering it but one (admittedly, sometimes important) variable in domestic policy development. 5 Analysis of UK climate policy development for business, which has been operational since April 2001, finds that policy transfer was deeply entwined in domestic politics. This paper does not intend to provide a comprehensive review of the policy transfer literature (for this, see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Bennett, 1991a; Evans and Davies, 1999) . 6 The ambition is more modest: to analyse the roles played by policy 4 Considerable transfer also followed colonial expansion in earlier centuries (Hada, 1959; Stone, 1999) . 5 Note that Dolowitz and Marsh (1999) rightly point out that policy transfer operates as both a dependent and an independent variable. The problematic for the policy transfer literature is to explain processes of policy transfer and explain their influence on policy outputs and outcomes. In this paper we are interested in policy transfer as independent variable (i.e. transfer influence on outputs). 6 A UK Economic and Social Research Council funded programme of 30 or so projects, called Future Governance, will also contribute to the theory of policy transfer (and learning). transfer in the development of UK climate policy for controlling business emissions of carbon dioxide. Consequently, conceptual discussion is limited to the possible roles policy transfer can play in policy development.
The science and politics of global warming has had a strong international dimension. It seems reasonable to expect UK climate policy-makers to be cosmopolitan in their formulation of policy. Indeed, in its response to a Trade and Industry Select Committee report the government claimed it was 'actively seeking to develop and maintain its awareness of other countries' policies and measures to meet climate change commitments' (HCSCTI, 1999: 1) . Instruments to control business carbon emissions are a major component in the UK Climate Change Programme (DETR, 2000) . The UK government has introduced three climate policy instruments with antecedents overseas: an energy tax; long-term negotiated agreements with industry; and an emissions trading scheme (see Box 1). These are novel policy instruments affecting the entire business sector. They warrant study and, on first inspection, the case for policy transfer appears strong.
The policy challenge posed by business carbon emissions is a relatively recent phenomenon: prior to the late 1990s there was very little policy intervention in this sector. 7 The policy transfer literature posits that when 'confronted with the need to solve a problem, and especially a new problem, there is probably a tendency to satisfice and to search for ready-made solutions in other jurisdictions' (Bennett, 1997: 213 ; also Rose, 1993) . Moreover, in situations where the problem area is novel the literature suggests there will be fewer barriers to policy transfer (owing to fewer prior commitments), and adoption will be relatively uncomplicated (Rose, 1993: 78; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 353) . Those recommending solutions to new problems can muster credibility if they can point out that states X and Y are pursuing similar approaches to those they recommend in their home state. Thus was the situation in UK climate policy. At a relatively high-level of abstraction, we notice that all three UK policy instruments have antecedents abroad, and government statements suggest transfer was involved. However, a finer grained analysis including the design of instrument settings, as presented here, finds policy was strongly influenced by purely domestic, interest-based bargaining. Understanding the dynamics driving developments in new policy sectors reminds us that even here the policy landscape is rarely virgin territory. Climate policy is one such sector. Box 1: the three different policy instruments in UK climate policy for business.
Energy taxation.
Energy taxation attempts to alter target group behaviour through the price mechanism. A tax on energy use raises its price and encourages more efficient use. Often the tax is based on the carbon content of the different forms of energy. Sources of energy with a higher carbon content, such as coal compared to gas, bear a higher tax rate. Thus the price mechanism can also promote a switch to forms of energy that have a lower carbon content and consequently fewer emissions of carbon dioxide. The UK business energy tax is called the Climate Change Levy (CCL). The elasticity between tax rate and energy reduction can be difficult to anticipate precisely, but the government hopes the CCL will cut emissions by 2.5 million tonnes of carbon (MtC) a year by 2010 (tax rates are: 0.43p/kWh electricity; 0.15p/kWh gas; 0.15p/kWh solid fuels; 0.15p/kWh LPG) (HM Treasury, 2001: 106) .
Negotiated agreements.
Negotiated agreements commit an industrial sector to meeting broad environmental performance targets over a fixed period of years. The agreement is between industry and government. Some agreements are merely voluntary accords (known as voluntary agreements), while others have a firmer legal basis and carry sanctions if the target is not met (negotiated agreements). Negotiations take place between the relevant government department(s) and the industry trade association. In UK climate policy, firms enjoy an 80% discount from the CCL if they sign up to a negotiated agreement, known as a Climate Change Levy Agreement (CCLA). Targets to reduce energy use per unit of product manufactured were agreed between the environment ministry and the relevant sector trade associations. It is hoped CCLA targets will deliver cuts of 2.5MtC a year by 2010 (HM Treasury, 2001: 106) .
Emissions trading.
An emissions trading scheme sets an aggregate emissions target for the scheme. A fixed number of tradable emission permits are then allocated to the trading participants. Each participant must ensure that its emissions are equal to or less than its current permit holdings. Those who face high pollution abatement costs can continue to pollute by buying additional permits. Those facing low costs can take abatement action and sell their surplus permits for a profit. In this way, each participant can trade off the cost of controlling pollution with the cost of buying or selling permits. This flexibility allows each participant to minimise its overall abatement costs. A voluntary emissions trading scheme will become operational in the UK later in 2002. There are uncertainties over the number of participants and hence the overall aggregate target. Initial hopes that the pilot scheme would bring about cuts of at least 2MtC by 2010 have been revised to 0.7MtC by 2006 (DEFRA, 2001b . CCLA holders can use trading mechanisms to meet their targets.
The different roles of policy transfer in domestic policy development In order to understand the roles policy transfer has played in the development of UK climate policy we need first to review briefly what the literature has to say about the different roles transfer can play. Dolowitz (2000: 3) defines policy transfer as 'the process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system'. Evans and Davies (1999: 382) distinguish between the 'soft' transfer of ideas, concepts and attitudes and the 'hard' transfer of policy instruments and programmes. One might thus expect soft transfer to precede hard transfer. Taylor and Horan (2001) describe how discourses influence the 'contextual receptivity' of a polity to certain forms of transfer and not others. Such distinctions suggest an analysis of the hard transfer of climate policy instruments must be sensitive to the background role played by the soft transfer of discourses. Identifying an instance of policy transfer empirically requires us to show that policy-makers were aware of similar policies in other jurisdictions and that this knowledge was utilised. Research must also show similarities in policies and identify the transfer agents (Bennett, 1997: 215; Evans and Davies, 1999: 382) . The hard transfer of climate policy instruments ought, therefore, to be a more straightforward process to identify than soft transfer since we have relatively discrete objects being transferred. In practice, isolating the hard transfer of climate policy instruments is tricky since they are soon softened up by domestic politics, as illustrated later in this discussion.
Policy transfer and lesson-drawing
We can identify possible roles for transfer by looking at the motivations behind it. Crossnational lesson-drawing is considered a sub-set of policy transfer (Dolowitz, 2000) . In lesson-drawing, policy actors look abroad for examples or innovations that can help them better understand or overcome policy challenges at home: there is a voluntary search for externally generated knowledge or policies to transfer (Rose, 1993) . Of course, the lesson drawn may be that transfer should not take place, or that some other policy innovation is needed back home. If the object of study is a policy fiasco, such as the BSE crisis in the UK, then the objective is to learn from others' mistakes and avoid repeating those mistakes back home (Stone, 1999: 52) . Such negative lessons are included in definitions of that which is transferred (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 12) , so even here, arguably, there is 'policy' transfer.
The specific motivations for looking beyond one's own jurisdiction are manifold (see Bennett, 1991b) , 8 but are bracketed by two general types (Stone, 1999: 56) . Policy transfer can be sought for reasons of pure lesson-drawing: a genuine desire to find an appropriate or innovative solution to a public policy issue. Alternatively, transfer can arise for instrumental reasons or strategic reasons, such as to legitimate decisions already taken (e.g. practices abroad that reinforce a prior position at home). Obviously there can be elements of both in any instance of policy transfer -lessons may be sought, but only those that fit in with domestic priorities or one's own ideology.
Coercive policy transfer
Lesson-drawing sits in contrast to instances of policy transfer that are forced upon a recipient jurisdiction, such as IMF structural readjustment programmes in exchange for loans. In practice, transfer may involve elements of both coercion and voluntarism: transfer may be forced upon an unwilling political system, but there may be some latitude over when or how a policy gets transferred. A good example of this 'negotiated transfer' (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 15) is the discretion Member States often exercise when putting obligatory EU legislation into practice, especially if imposed under Qualified Majority Voting (Jordan, 1999; Smith, 2001) . The development of UK climate policy was not coerced as such. However, the European dimension does play a background role in another sense. EU membership exposed UK civil servants to the values, assumptions and instruments held by their counterparts in other Member States. This Europeanisation, operating at the level of meetings in Brussels and through formal and informal networks, opens up channels for voluntary transfer in addition to negotiations over Directives (Jordan, 2002: 292) .
Agents of policy transfer
Institutions such as the EU, and looser supranational organisations like the OECD, are one agent of transfer identified in the literature. Others include: elected officials; political parties; bureaucrats/civil servants; pressure groups; policy entrepreneurs and experts; trans-national corporations; think tanks; supra-national government; non-government organisations and consultants. The literature posits that these may directly advise government departments already committed to importing policies. In other cases, the agent may be advocating a transferable lesson by lobbying government. In such instances advocates of transfer are clearly operating within the milieu of domestic politics.
Policy transfer and domestic policy development
Concepts of policy transfer elaborated in the literature tend to present it as a fairly discrete phenomenon. The literature posits transfer as involving either the copying, emulation, or synthesis/hybridisation of policies from other states (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 351; Rose, 1993: 30) . The implication is that the copy/emulation/hybrid becomes fixed during transfer and then inserted into the domestic setting for implementation. This has prompted Stone (1999: 56) to ask: 'At what point does policy transfer end in practice?' A stages view of policy-making is implied: transfer will end at some point and purely domestic development will take over (Evans and Davies, 1999: 377) . Teasing out this division between policy transfer and policy development could prove fuzzy empirically. At what point can we definitely say the transfer process has ended? With 'hard' transfer the process is complete when the policy instrument has become operational. The end point to the soft transfer of ideas may be more difficult to isolate: is it when Ministers adopt the discourse in debates; or when policy programmes embody the ideas (which implies hard transfer has happened too)? The literature tends not to concern itself with how transfers get implemented. This does not mean policy transfer scholars deny the significance of implementing the transferred policy: the recent interest in relationships between transfer processes and policy success or failure illustrates this (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 17) .
9 However, conceptual links between policy transfer and domestic policy development have tended to be overlooked to date.
Transferred policies have to be adopted by domestic polities (Stone, 1999: 56) . It seems reasonable to expect this adoption process to alter the policy that is transferred: the transferred objects 'are indigenised … This process of modification in transfer requires closer investigation to determine when transfer processes cease' (Stone, 1999: 56) . Stone hopes that 'further development of the policy transfer concept may illuminate the circumstances in which ideas, knowledge and learning prevail over interests, resource constraints and real politik in policy making' (Stone, 1999: 54) . Yet instances of instrumental transfer (see above) are by definition riddled with interest-based motivations from the outset. Moreover, any transferred policy will have to negotiate a way through domestic policy processes, and in so doing the policy transferred may become transformed. At the same time, the domestic policy context may shift as a result of transfer through a process of mutual adaptation (Smith, 2001 ). These issues imply analysing transfer empirically may not prove to be so clear-cut as it is presented empirically.
To summarise the conceptual discussion. In any study of transfer we must identify the agents of transfer and that which is being transferred. Policy transfer can play a variety of roles in domestic policy development. It can be a coercive force for change imposed by higher authorities. It can reflect a genuine search for policy lessons useful to overcoming policy challenges at home. Or it can be used instrumentally to bolster a prior position or legitimate decisions that have effectively already been taken. Soft transfer may precede hard transfers. Conceptual relationships between the roles of transfer and domestic policy development are not especially clear. Moreover, the neatness with which the literature conceptualises policies as discrete objects could prove much fuzzier in practice. While the transfer literature makes a useful analytical distinction between ideas and interests in transfer processes, the empirical realities in UK climate policy development may not be so clear cut.
UK CLIMATE POLICY FOR BUSINESS
Controlling business carbon emissions differs from traditional pollution control in two important respects. First, the majority of carbon emissions arise through energy use, which makes them highly pervasive, and associates them with many aspects of economic activity. Second, carbon dioxide emissions cannot easily be captured by end-of-pipe treatment. Instead, emission reductions must be achieved by switching to lower carbon fuels, or by improving energy efficiency, or both. These two features structure the problem and imply a policy response that affects business's core activities in a way that traditional pollution regulation does not. Economic theorists argue that energy taxes, emissions trading and negotiated agreements are more appropriate policy instruments for affecting such diffuse pollution than traditional command-and-control regulations (Moran, 1996) .
The UK environment ministry 10 routinely uses consultants for information on policy issues, such as energy, as part of its background work in policy support. The Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU) of AEA Technology, an important (privatised) contractor to government for advice on business energy efficiency, have developed a comprehensive model to analyse the potential for energy and carbon savings in business (ETSU, 1996; . In 1996 they reported to the Department of Environment (DoE) that all technically possible measures could cut business carbon dioxide emissions by 36% from 1990 levels and that, depending upon the discount rate used, between 66% and 85% of these cuts could be achieved cost-effectively. The challenge for policy-makers was to realise this energy efficiency potential.
At this time, DoE civil servants were keeping appraised of overseas developments in negotiated agreements through reports by organisations such as the OECD. DoE civil servants went on a fact-finding trip to the Netherlands about the use of negotiated agreements as a general tool of environmental policy, and Dutch officials visited the UK. This is the only evidence of any direct search overseas by DoE officials and was not specific to climate policy. Europeanisation meant civil servants were aware of climate policy developments in other Member States. Negotiations concerning the failed introduction of a European carbon/energy tax provided a more specific source of crossnational comparison. All this was routine policy support: the evidence does not amount to a search for policies to transfer. Indeed, there was little concrete climate policy development coming from Ministers. The 1994 climate change programme relied on voluntary measures for curbing business carbon emissions (DoE, 1994) . A purely voluntary agreement on energy efficiency targets had been signed with the Chemical Industries Association (CIA) in November 1997. The environment ministry urged other sectors to sign agreements, but none came forward. The CIA was a special case. They operate a Responsible Care programme promoting members' environmental performance and the voluntary agreement was a device to boost the public legitimacy of their programme at that time (CIA, 1998: 24) .
A policy window
On entering government in May 1997 new Labour brought with them a manifesto commitment to cut carbon dioxide emissions 20% below 1990 levels by 2010 (New Labour, 1997: 39) . This implied a cut of around 34 million tonnes of carbon (MtC), and that by 2010 total UK carbon dioxide emissions should be 134 MtC or less (DETR, 2000: 52) . The unilateral target proved more challenging than the subsequent UK commitment 10 The UK environment ministry has been re-structured and re-named three times in recent years. In 1997 the Department of the Environment became the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). In 2001, key environmental protection functions within DETR became part of the new Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). to cut greenhouse gases by 12.5% under the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Structural changes in the economy, particularly the widespread move from coal-fired to gas-fired electricity generation, meant the UK was already some way to meeting its Kyoto target. The unilateral target required extra policy intervention and injected urgency into climate policy development. Business, as a major emitter of carbon dioxide, 11 became a key policy target. New Labour also appeared to bring a predisposition for environmental tax reform (New Labour, 1997: 12) . Gordon Brown, in his first budget speech as Chancellor, expressed a commitment to environmental objectives and announced that reforms would be included in future budgets (House of Commons Debates, 2 nd July 1997, Column 311).
The earlier conceptual discussion of soft and hard transfer implies that we should look for evidence that, in expressing an interest in environmental tax reform, the new government was accepting a new, if little implemented, discourse in environmental policy. A transfer hypothesis argues that, whilst the change in government provided a window of opportunity for introducing new climate policy instruments, it was the softer diffusion and transfer of an environmental policy discourse into UK politics that is a better point of departure for analysis. We should consequently find interest in taxation for climate policy has its genesis in the rise of a new environmental policy discourse.
Contextual receptivity: environmental discourse and employment policy
Pressure to institute climate policy came at a time when traditional command-and-control approaches to industrial pollution were out of favour with policy elites. Whatever the original merits, the hands-on regulation of emission limits for specific polluting activities became tarred as administratively cumbersome, and the perceived inflexibility in this approach was believed to lead to economically inefficient solutions (Pearce et al, 1989) . A leading new discourse emerged in the nineties, based around advocacy of market-based or flexible policy instruments -environmental taxes, negotiated agreements and emissions trading (Golub, 1998; Weale, 1992; Pearce et al, 1989) . The diffusion of these ideas was assisted by supra-national organisations such as the OECD (OECD, 1989) , and promoted nationally by think-tanks (Pearson and Smith, 1990; Owens et al, 1990; Taylor, 1992) . Academics such as Paul Ekins and David Pearce were also active in arguing the (more theoretical) case for environmental tax reform to policy-making audiences (e.g. consultancy to government and evidence to Parliamentary Select Committees).
However, the new discourse in favour of flexible and market-based approaches did not advance purely for reasons of lesson-learning (theoretical and practical) about its greater efficiency and effectiveness. There was an element of instrumentality too. Structural conditions reproduce opportunities and constraints for competing political discourse (Taylor and Horan, 2001: 375) . Framing the lessons drawn about efficient environmental policy instruments was a neo-liberal ideology that influenced the meaning of, for example, efficiency and how best to be efficient (Collier, 1998) . The new 'environmental discourse was increasingly emphasising the need to release capital from the constraints of command and control measures' (Taylor and Horan, 2001: 383) . Negotiated agreements, taxation and emissions trading were all policy instruments offering business some flexibility over environmental obligations so as not to harm their international competitiveness.
Discourses influence the 'contextual receptivity' of states to certain types of transfer and not others: 'what is sought, where it is sought and how receptive we are to what we find, are all elements of transfer profoundly influenced by a particular political discourse' (Taylor and Horan, 2001: 375) . The UK government, first Conservative and subsequently new Labour, have been no different to others in stating a policy preference for marketbased solutions to environmental problems (HMG, 1990; HMG, 1999) . From a policy transfer perspective, the earlier 'soft' diffusion and transfer of a discourse opened up some climate policy options while closing down others. Government preference for certain types of policy instrument was influenced by the transfer of 'soft' ideas (with think tanks and academics acting as transfer agents) which reflected debates diffusing internationally (Tindale and Hewett, 1998; Weale, 1992) . The discourse moulded the contextual receptiveness to any subsequent hard transfer of instrument types. It seems almost inevitable, therefore, that UK climate policy development would introduce policy instruments that fitted the new mould.
Discourse and contextual receptivity offers a plausible explanation for a general orientation toward new policy instruments, but it fails to explain why new Labour appeared to be leading with taxation rather than the other instruments (negotiated agreements and emissions trading). Within the new discourse there was debate over the relative merits of each instrument (Tietenberg, 1992) . No instrument was clearly better than the other in terms of economic and environmental effectiveness. Specific contexts were important; as was who one talked to. So why was tax favoured over the others? Thinking and debate on environmental tax reform was more advanced than with emissions trading (although trading was practised in the US). And, unlike negotiated agreements, tax dovetailed with an important objective of the new Treasury team: a wish to reform the tax system to encourage work, which included lower labour costs to employers (New Labour, 1997: 12) . One aspect of the new environmental discourse in particular adhered to this interest: revenue losses through reductions in employers' National Insurance contributions could be offset through new environmental taxes. Neither emissions trading nor negotiated agreements offered this opportunity for synergy between environmental and employment policy.
This explanation, rooted in domestic politics, seems all the more reasonable when we recall how few environmental policy developments reflected the new discourse: a landfill tax, introduced in 1996; an annual increase in motor fuel duty from 1994; and the 1997 voluntary energy agreement with the chemical industry. Other voluntary agreements were struck over HFCs and chemicals in detergents. However, many other initiatives failedsuch as a trading scheme for sulphur emissions (Sorrell, 1999) , additional voluntary agreements with business (Eden, 1997; ENDS, 1998) , and a long-standing proposal to tax aggregates -because they did not fit around existing regulatory approaches, or because they lacked a sufficiently influential political constituency. The European Commission proposal for an energy-carbon tax was resisted in the UK on grounds of sovereignty and strong business lobbying. Conservative Chancellor Norman Lamont did introduce VAT on domestic energy in his 1993 budget, but this was deeply unpopular and criticised as a regressive budget balancing measure, rather than a green tax (Tindale and Hewett, 1998) .
Of course adoption of a discourse by government does not automatically lead to its straightforward implementation (Smith, 2000) . Policy commitments in other areas and interest-based politics get in the way and have to be persuaded to yield. New Labour opposed VAT on domestic energy and reduced it to a minimum when it took power in 1997. They believed the tax hit the 'fuel poor' hardest (i.e. the 5 million households who spend more than ten per cent of their income on energy due to poverty and inefficient housing stock). On the other hand, Labour remained open to ideas about taxing the business use of energy (Labour Party, 1994) . This also tuned contextual receptivity in subsequent climate policy development: do not hit the domestic (voting) sector with the sensitive issue of tax; do consider targeting the business sector.
Think-tanks, Advisory Committees and Policy Transfer
Use of other instruments was being proposed (see below), yet tax was clearly favoured in the Treasury. How did Brown's new Treasury team learn of the opportunities offered by an energy tax? One key agent was a think-tank that had helped develop new Labour thinking in other policy areas too. A role for policy transfer emerges again. The Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) was a key policy entrepreneur pushing for an energy tax on business. Stephen Tindale at IPPR had been secretary to the Labour Party's Policy Commission on the Environment. At IPPR he produced a number of publications advocating environmental tax reform. IPPR was involved in an EU-wide research programme on environmental tax reform that looked specifically at experiences and developments in other countries (Tindale and Holtham, 1996) . IPPR influence was boosted when Brown's shadow Treasury team commissioned Tindale to present ideas and strategies for environmental tax reform once in government. An energy tax was the 'most obvious case' for environmental taxation, and there were lessons that could be transferred from abroad (Tindale and Holtham, 1996: 79) .
IPPR used foreign evidence when pushing its design for a business energy tax. It cited the Finnish experience when it argued a tax should be levied on final business users of energy rather than producers of energy. Finland was moving from the latter to the former because: a) this presented more visible, clearer signals for changing behaviour, and b) it did not discriminate between indigenous and imported sources of energy. Other lessons were drawn from Germany, Sweden, and Denmark. IPPR suggested energy intensive sectors subject to international competition should be exempt from the full tax in return for some form of energy efficiency commitment, as in Denmark and the Netherlands. Renewable energy should also be exempt (Tindale and Holtham, 1996) . IPPR ran seminars to press their case (attended by civil servants as well as business and environmental interests). By 1998 they were setting out their 'blueprint for a business energy tax' that included lessons from European countries (Hewett, 1998 (Jacobs, 1996; Cambridge Econometrics, 1998) .
Another influential player in the fine tuning of policy options was the government's Advisory Committee on Business and Environment. ACBE was created in 1991. The Secretaries of State for the Environment and Trade and Industry appoint its membership of business leaders, civil servants and academics. On the business side, appointments were sought from sectors beyond than the smoke-stack industry representatives who tended to dominate environmental committees in the Confederation of British Industry (CBI). Like IPPR, ACBE had the ear of government. 12 In August 1997, the Prime Minister's office asked ACBE to consider the climate change issue. Some ACBE members were familiar with overseas innovations in market-based policy instruments, including emissions trading. The ACBE report favoured negotiated agreements but accepted some residual taxation may be necessary (ACBE, 1998). Significantly, ACBE argued 'early action' to develop emissions trading in the UK was 'essential ' (1998: 16) . To this end, ACBE urged government to implement energy efficiency requirements under new industrial pollution regulations (the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive, IPPC) through sectoral negotiated agreements in order not to hinder the development of emissions trading approaches.
In March 1998, in order to pave the way for climate policy-making, the Chancellor appointed high-profile business leader, Sir Colin Marshall, 13 to head a Treasury-led inquiry into whether and how market-based instruments could improve business energy use. While the Treasury preferred a tax and played down trading, they nevertheless felt it necessary to include it in the inquiry remit (interview evidence). The Kyoto Protocol, signed in December 1997, included provisions for an international emissions trading scheme between countries. This raised the political saliency of this instrument. Heavy energy users and generators, such as the Association of Electricity Producers (AEP), were lobbying for trading instead of tax. ACBE wanted the UK to lead in the new, potentially highly profitable, global market in tradable carbon permits initiated by Kyoto. Thus the inquiry remit expanded to include trading.
12 ACBE report to the Prime Minister's office. The government's Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Bob May, and the Energy Advisory Panel were also pressing government for action on climate policy (ENDS, 1997). The Panel suggested an energy tax should be part of a mix of instruments. 13 Former president of the Confederation of British Industry and Chairman of British Airways.
Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott and Trade and Industry Secretary Peter Mandelson, in a response to ACBE, wrote how their report 'helped inform' the government launch of the Marshall inquiry and climate policy development. Above all, they agreed with ACBE 'that measures taken must not lessen UK competitiveness' (ACBE, 1998b: 5) . The Treasury's initial search had been framed by an interest in taxation, but policy development options were opened by Kyoto and the Marshall inquiry. However, government political interest in avoiding impacts upon household energy bills meant the inquiry remit did not extend to electricity generation. There was no straightforward way of preventing the costs of carbon reduction measures in this sector being passed onto households as well as businesses. This domestic interest circumscribed the inquiry and restricted policy transfer opportunities.
Inquiries and policy transfer
Marshall consulted informally and formally. In addition to meetings with business leaders, environmentalists and his cross-departmental team of civil servants, he also met with environmental economists who had studied the operation of different market-based policy instruments overseas. This included some with knowledge of emissions trading schemes operating in the US. ACBE met with Marshall in June, where they were able to discuss their report (ACBE, 1998b) . Following these discussions, Marshall's formal consultation paper called for responses to questions about energy taxation and emissions trading.
Responses to Marshall's consultation questions were mixed. Business, by far the largest respondent, generally preferred voluntary agreements. There was widespread opposition to an energy tax. Some business leaders, notably in the energy industries, favoured emissions trading as an alternative to a tax. Environmentalists, such as Friends of the Earth, pressed for a tax that recycled some of the revenue into subsidies for low-carbon technologies, as had been suggested by a Green Tax Commission in the Netherlands (IPPR et al, 1999) . Marshall also looked overseas for lessons. His report, published in November 1998, included information about emissions trading schemes in the US and proposals elsewhere. It also provided details about energy and carbon tax schemes in six European countries (Marshall, 1998) .
The (Treasury administered) Marshall inquiry concluded in favour of an energy tax. It did not rule out trading, but argued that consensus over important design issues remained unresolved. Marshall suggested a pilot trading scheme be set up. Thinking on taxation was more developed and options for the design of this policy instrument clearer (Marshall, 1998) . Marshall recommended that tax discounts to buffer the impact upon the international competitiveness of energy intensive users be based on energy costs (a measure widely accepted in energy circles). Marshall echoed some consultation responses in pointing out that energy use varied considerably within sectors and few sectors could really be considered as energy intensive. 14 A focus on policy transfer makes us sensitive to the way overseas experience filters into domestic debates about the relative merits of different climate policy instruments. Several participants were familiar with the operation of instruments overseas and transmitted this information into domestic debate. This evidence filtered into UK policy development through many interconnected channels -IPPR, ACBE, Marshall -where it mixed with theory-and interest-based arguments. Lessons were introduced through a complex web of discussions based around meetings (formal and informal), seminars, reports and consultation responses. Marshall's recommendations to adopt the tax were based on there being greater evidence and consensus over the design of this instrument compared to trading, and that a tax was more appropriate for smaller companies (Marshall, 1998) . That is, the instrument was better understood and more widely applicable. However, we also know that the inquiry was led by the Treasury, whose interest in climate policy was already directed along tax lines owing to their employment policy objectives. Consultation responses show support for the tax option was slight, yet it still went through. This can be interpreted in two ways. First, it demonstrates just how committed was the Treasury interest in an energy tax. Or second, ideas about taxation were more developed intellectually and ensured these won out over the alternatives. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, and there is evidence for both.
Business climate policy takes shape
The Chancellor announced the government's Climate Change Levy (CCL) package for business in his budget address in March 1999. Marshall's report had been 'fully considered' (Hansard, 3 rd November 1998, Column 686). A business energy tax would be introduced in April 2001. The Treasury Red Book anticipated the tax raising £1.75 billion, the majority of which would be recycled through a 0.5% cut in employer National Insurance contributions. Over £50 million would be set aside to subsidise energy efficiency initiatives. Intensive energy sectors that entered into a negotiated agreement with energy efficiency targets (a Climate Change Levy Agreement, CCLA) would receive a 50% discount from the Levy. The discussion above has explained how Ministers were made aware of initiatives overseas and by which agents. In the Chancellor's budget statement we find a policy framework similar to European initiatives. According to the literature this is the final methodological test for policy transfer (Bennett, 1997; Evans and Davies, 1999 ). Yet despite climate policy satisfying these criteria, isolating the influence of transfer remains fuzzy and indirect. It is difficult to draw a sharp line between policy transfer and domestic policy development in the sequential way implied in the literature. Unsurprisingly, domestic developments show even stronger in the detailed formulation of the CCL framework. Leaders from nine UK 'energy intensive' sectors 15 met the Deputy Prime Minister to discuss the package. In response to continued business lobbying against the tax, CCLAs and deeper, 80% discounts were made available to more sectors.
The negotiation of CCLAs became the responsibility of the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). DETR chose installations regulated under industrial pollution regulations (IPPC) as a proxy for intensive energy users. Marshall, the House of Commons Select Committee on Trade and Industry (HCSTI, 1999b) , and others (e.g. IPPR) argued this was an inappropriate yardstick. Government explained it was more straightforward administratively and enabled energy efficiency targets under IPPC to be met through the CCLAs. Yet IPPC proved too approximate a yardstick for energy intensive industry. It was a case of the DETR's left hand, responsible for climate policy, choosing not to understand fully the detailed work of its right hand, which was transposing the IPPC Directive. First, IPPC included many sectors which, by any definition, were quite clearly not energy intensive. Second, non-IPPC sectors, such as the water industry, were brought in because they were clearly intensive energy users. However, water, and some others, are not subject to international competition (the original rationale for tax discounts). Third, a few sectors even lobbied government to bring them under IPPC regulations, ostensibly because they were more polluting than government thought, but really so that they could qualify for a discount from the Levy (ENDS, 2001) . Finally, other sectors obtained CCLA discounts because they were in competition with CCLA sectors and competition law (including EU State Aids rules) required that they be treated equally. This episode indicates how domestic political bargaining, administrative convenience (over IPPC) and institutional imperative (competition law), can bend and channel the design parameters of policy packages. Concessions over discounts also served to vent some of the opposition to the tax. The magnitude of the concessions was considerable. By the start date for the CCL, April 2001, forty-one industrial sectors had signed CCLAs with government. Around 40% of business energy use now received an 80% discount from the Levy.
A role for policy transfer becomes less evident once the CCL package takes shape. Transfer involved the introduction into domestic debate of ideas for general frameworks for instruments, rather than a detailed blueprint ready for immediate application. Specific aspects of the package, such as which industrial sectors to discount, were set by the bargaining and unanticipated consequences of administrative streamlining and institutional imperative.
The non-policy transfer of negotiated agreement good practice
The notional growth in UK intensive energy industry, and the associated 80% discount, suggest the impact of the energy tax to be massively reduced. But one has to look at the package as a whole. The CCL pushed over 7000 industrial firms into negotiated agreements for reducing their energy use. The CCL successfully put energy use onto many boardroom agendas and pushed them into signing CCLAs. A few years earlier the government was unable to persuade a single sector into agreement on energy.
Arguably, the energy reduction targets negotiated between trade associations and government are not particularly stringent. Targets for 40 of the sectors are reductions in energy use relative to production output. Total energy use could still rise if production output climbs faster than unit energy use declines. Government had the ETSU model of energy saving potentials to help it overcome some of the information asymmetries that plague these sorts of negotiation (Glachant, 1994) . Unfortunately, the ETSU database lacked information for some of the unanticipated sectors in negotiation. 16 Moreover, the negotiation burden was huge: civil servants at DETR had less than two years to negotiate 41 agreements. It had taken as long to negotiate the single 1997 agreement with the chemical industry. Resources were limited and there was insufficient time for a thorough, independent survey for missing data.
17 Given the enormity of the task, it is a wonder all the CCLAs were struck on time.
Government negotiators were ill-placed to assess the extent to which capital and managerial constraints really did limit, as industry claimed, the ability of sectors to take up all 'cost-effective' energy efficiency measures. The chief negotiator for DETR admitted that they were hampered by a lack of knowledge about future market growth and technological development (ENDS, 2001) . Targets in the ten year agreements vary from sector to sector. ETSU calculate that, on average, the targets will require firms to implement 60% of the 'cost-effective' measures beyond business-as-usual (ETSU, 2001) . Only measures with short pay-back times of two to four years were assumed. The sanction for non-compliant firms will be to begin paying the full tax rate until they are back on course to meet their target. Payment is not retrospective and has been criticised as a lax sanction by environmentalists, as was the closed and opaque nature of the negotiations (Friends of the Earth, 2001).
Here government appears deliberately not to have transferred lessons about good practice for negotiated agreements. Similar concerns about lax targets and sanctions have been associated with negotiated agreements practised in other countries. Both the European Commission and the European Environment Agency have issued guidelines drawing upon criticisms of existing agreements in France, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark (CEC, 1996; EEA, 1997) . Recommendations such as pooling data through wide stakeholder consultation, transparent negotiation, a clear legal standing and dissuasive sanctions were not transferred into UK practice.
The European guidelines could have served as a transfer agent for negative lesson learning. Why, at this critical stage of policy development, were these lessons ignored? The tight timetable is one factor. A more open and inclusive process of negotiation would have been drawn out as divergent interests bargained over a compromise. There was also an element of learning-by-doing as both negotiating parties assessed degrees of trust and generally felt their way toward mutually agreeable targets. Third parties would simply have been too complicating and fractious a factor, and one contrary to the traditional UK policy style on environmental issues (Vogel, 1986) . Such factors are at play in longstanding regulatory encounters, and are likely to be more pronounced in new meetings to negotiate unfamiliar instruments (Fineman and Sturdy, 1999; Smith , 1997) . Here we have an example of non-transfer playing an instrumental role. Overseas lessons were ignored in order to smooth agreement over the detailed design of a new policy instrument. The risk is that failure to transfer the aforementioned procedural lessons will damage the long-term credibility and legitimacy of the CCLAs.
Muddling through on emissions trading
Emissions trading did not feature in the original CCL package but this did not mean government had written it off. Legislative provisions enabling the Secretary of State to create an emissions trading scheme were included in the Pollution Prevention and Control Bill (promulgating the IPPC Directive) in November 1999. Both DETR and DTI were 'keen to see a non-statutory pilot scheme' (HCSCTI, 1999b, para.15; ENDS, 1998: 5) . Some business leaders, such as the AEP, continued lobbying for trading. Somewhat to the surprise of government, in June 1999, the CBI and ACBE created an Emissions Trading Group (ETG) of businesses whose objective was to design a voluntary trading scheme as an alternative to taxation. Their outline proposal was welcomed by government, who encouraged the ETG to develop its ideas further.
ETG discussion topics included trading proposals emerging overseas -such as in Norway, France, Germany and the US experience. Some members had studied the US sulphur trading scheme, while others, like BP, were developing in-house carbon emissions trading between their operations around the world. Close liaison between government and the ETG continued, and civil servants from a number of Departments attended the meetings of this business-led initiative. Liaison ensured that the ETG were aware of any government priorities which might restrain design options. One key constraint was the firewall around the household sector. This effectively excluded the electricity sector -an obvious participant in emissions trading -because participation would affect household energy prices. Many other obvious participants had CCLAs. An incentive was needed to get them to join the voluntary trading scheme in order to ensure the critical mass of participants needed to make the scheme a success. Thus links were proposed that would allow CCLA holders to buy carbon permits from the pilot scheme as a means to comply with their CCLA target. Or, if they over-complied with the CCLA target, then they could generate carbon permits which they could sell into the voluntary scheme. Design of the trading scheme was being influenced by a need to allow CCLA holders to participate. They were already able to trade energy reductions with each other as part of their CCLA compliance strategy. Now they could use the voluntary trading scheme as an additional compliance strategy. This twofold flexibility makes the original CCLA targets even less onerous.
This need to fit a voluntary trading scheme around the government's new CCL package complicated its design. Some features follow neither theoretical principles of good design nor pay heed to experience abroad. Instead, the design process muddled-through and fitted around the recently forged climate policy landscape. A survey of 251 business financial directors found 73% critical of this complexity (CIMA, 2000) . The voluntary trading scheme was launched by government in August 2001. It follows the ETG design. Being a voluntary scheme, it was unclear why any firm needing to buy emissions permits would join the scheme. Only net sellers of permits had any incentive to join. The ETG consequently persuaded the Treasury to offer £215 million as a direct financial incentive for firms to take the risk of participating in the pilot (DEFRA, 2001) . 18 Total industrial expenditure on energy was £6.18 billion in 2000 (DTI, 2001: 47) . Around thirty firms are believed to have expressed a genuine interest in the scheme though it is unclear how many will be net permit sellers and how many buyers (interview evidence). Even the government has revised downward the emission cuts its expects the pilot to achieve (DEFRA, 2001b) .
Government understandably wishes to develop emissions trading without taking the sort of leap that would require a massive reconfiguration of the CCL package it negotiated so recently. Why is the government taking this policy risk with trading when it has only just introduced the CCL package? It hopes the voluntary scheme will become a platform for UK participation in the potentially lucrative international carbon permit markets. Announcing the pilot scheme, Environment Minister, Michael Meacher, M.P., said, 'This scheme establishes the UK as a world leader in the field of greenhouse gas emissions trading, giving British business a head start in this developing new market' (DEFRA, 2001) . Government hopes the pilot will put the City of London ahead of other financial centres as a leading and profitable trader in carbon markets emerging as a result of the Kyoto Protocol (DEFRA, 2001b).
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What is striking about the resurrection of trading is that policy development was led by a business consortium. They delivered to government a design which the latter welcomed. However, the design of the voluntary scheme was hampered by the CCL package restricting participation and a policy commitment to shield the household sector. This constrained opportunities to transfer lessons about trading from other jurisdictions. As with the CCL package, but here more pronounced, we see how the hard transfer of a policy instrument, in this case emissions trading, is limited to the adoption of a general framework, and that some of the design variables critical to its successful operation are constrained by prior domestic commitments. Lessons about the professed efficacy and effectiveness of these new instruments are drawn, and it is these that make the adoption of the novel policy instrument an attractive proposition. However, purely domestic developments soon transform the policy being transferred. The UK voluntary scheme is being watched with interest by other countries. However, it is a very British trading scheme, designed to fit around existing UK policy commitments. As such, there will be serious problems of compatibility with a proposed European Commission Directive on emissions trading (CEC, 2001 ).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
All three instruments operating in UK climate policy on business carbon emissions have antecedents overseas. The development of UK climate policy satisfies the methodological criteria for demonstrating transfer: policy-makers were aware of overseas experience; this knowledge was utilised; and there are similarities between instruments in the UK and overseas (Bennett, 1997: 215; Evans and Davies, 1999: 382) . Yet the precise role, and hence impact, of policy transfer in this account appears limited to broad lessons about the policy instruments. All we can say with confidence is that transferred evidence provided options for instrument choice and high-level design. Contrary to initial expectations, there was little obvious transfer in the clear-cut way conceptualised in the literature. It was mainly domestic policy development with a little cross-national lesson-drawing thrown into debates.
Government became aware of transfer possibilities indirectly via domestic policy debate. A variety of transfer agents (think-tanks, an inquiry, and a business consortium) brought foreign evidence to government attention. 'Transfer agent' is a label bestowing too much influence upon these actors. It was government who ultimately decided on the CCL package and the trading pilot. They accepted or rejected the overseas lessons presented to them alongside other claims during consultation processes. Intermediary is perhaps a more accurate label for those who ensured the policy radar swept beyond the UK. The evidence they transmitted served both transfer roles elaborated in the literature: it played, by turns, a lesson-drawing role and a more instrumental role. The clearest example of instrumentality was the rejection of transferable guidelines for the negotiation of CCLAs.
There is evidence that the softer transfer of a discourse favouring flexible and marketbased policies opened the way for the energy tax and negotiated agreements. New Labour's election, at a time of growing pressure for climate action, provided a window of opportunity. However, Treasury interest in progressing energy taxation in particular was also influenced by employment policy options as well as environmental protection. The precise design of instrument settings was strongly influenced by domestic bargaining (e.g. energy tax rates, definitions of intensive energy users). It is here where any suggestion of transfer ends and purely domestic, interest-based politics takes over. Moreover, it is these instrument settings that will influence final policy outcomes most strongly.
What the policy transfer literature reminds us is that solutions to public problems rarely materialize out of thin air, and that an adequate account of policy development should explore the roles and provenance of information, knowledge and ideas. However, in this particular case, which appears initially to show all the hallmarks of policy transfer, we find it difficult to tease out a clear division between transfer and domestic development. Transfer entwined and interacted inseparably with domestic politics. The CCL package has accelerated business thinking on emissions trading. The ETG looked abroad for some answers but had to adapt lessons to national circumstance. Now other states are studying the UK trading scheme. This constant cross-fertilisation of ideas, moving back-and-forth between states, can be one driver of policy development. Ultimately, however, policy transfer has to fold back into the domestic dynamics and interests of policy systems.
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